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arXiv 2411.03608econ.TH
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从设计到披露

From Design to Disclosure

Pennsylvania State University(宾夕法尼亚州立大学);University of Bonn(波恩大学);University of Queensland(昆士兰大学)

S. Nageeb Ali, Andreas Kleiner, Kun Zhang

AI总结:

本文研究了在接收方能调整交易条款的市场中,硬信息如何使发送方无需承诺信息结构即可实现承诺收益。

摘要:

本文研究了在接收方可以灵活调整分配和转移以回应发送方披露的合同和市场设置中硬信息的作用。这些设置包括垄断定价、双边交易中的相互依赖价值、保险合同和政策谈判。在这些设置中,发送方如果完全披露她的类型会最糟:如果她的类型被知晓,接收方可以调整交易条款以提取她的盈余。以这一特征为文献的主要出发点,我们刻画了这些披露游戏中的全部均衡收益。我们建立了等价结果:任何可以通过信息设计实现的收益剖面也可以通过披露游戏的均衡近似。因此,硬信息使发送方能够达到其承诺收益而无需承诺信息结构。此外,这一结果突显了可验证性如何在谈判权在接收方的设置中增强发送方的能力。

英文摘要:

This paper studies the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender's disclosure. These settings include monopoly pricing, bilateral trade with interdependent values, insurance contracting, and policy negotiations. Across these settings, the sender is worst off if she reveals her type completely: if her type becomes known, the receiver can adjust the terms of trade to extract her surplus. Taking this feature as our central departure from the literature, we characterize the entire set of equilibrium payoffs across these disclosure games. We establish an equivalence result: every payoff profile that can be achieved through information design can also be approximated by an equilibrium of the disclosure game. Thus, hard information enables the sender to attain her commitment payoff without having to commit to an information structure. Moreover, this result highlights how verifiability can empower the sender in settings in which bargaining power resides with the receiver.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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