大证据空间下的披露博弈
Disclosure Games with Large Evidence Spaces
摘要:
我们研究了一个大证据空间的披露博弈。存在未知的二进制状态。发送方观察关于状态的二进制信号序列,并向接收方披露该序列的左截断,以使接收方相信状态是好的。我们专注于真理倾向均衡(参见。Hart et al.(2017)),其中发送者在这样做是最佳的情况下如实披露,而接收者则以表面价值接受偏离路径的披露。在平衡中,公开了看似次优的截断,并且本公开包含产生好信号和坏信号的数量之间的最大差异的最长截断。我们还研究了一个通用的框架,披露游戏,这是兼容的大证据空间,广泛的披露技术,和许多国家。我们刻画了发送者的唯一均衡价值函数,并提出了一种方法来构建广泛的一类游戏的均衡。
英文摘要:
We study a disclosure game with a large evidence space. There is an unknown binary state. A sender observes a sequence of binary signals about the state and discloses a left truncation of the sequence to a receiver in order to convince him that the state is good. We focus on truth-leaning equilibria (cf. Hart et al. (2017)), where the sender discloses truthfully when doing so is optimal, and the receiver takes off-path disclosure at face value. In equilibrium, seemingly sub-optimal truncations are disclosed, and the disclosure contains the longest truncation that yields the maximal difference between the number of good and bad signals. We also study a general framework of disclosure games which is compatible with large evidence spaces, a wide range of disclosure technologies, and finitely many states. We characterize the unique equilibrium value function of the sender and propose a method to construct equilibria for a broad class of games.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。