AI 中文总结
本研究探讨委托代理合同中代理人策略性披露行动空间的影响，证明代理人可获至少第一最佳剩余的1/e效用，并给出收入与福利保证，揭示披露策略对剩余分配的关键作用。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究委托代理合同中的行动空间策略性披露问题，其中代理人选择一个披露的行动集，以在合同设计前塑造委托人对她能力的认知。委托人未意识到这种策略性披露，将披露的行动集视为完整且准确的，从而设计收入最优的合同。我们考虑两种因成本可验证性而区分的变体。当成本不可验证时，代理人可以提取全部第一最佳剩余，使委托人获得零收入。当成本可验证时，我们在二元结果情形下刻画了代理人的最优披露策略，并在更一般的情况下（当委托人被限制使用线性合同时）刻画了该策略，将代理人的问题简化为一个双变量凸优化问题。我们证明代理人能够获得至少第一最佳剩余的$1/e$比例的效用，这也在最优披露下产生了$1/e$的福利保证。虽然与第一最佳剩余相比，委托人的收入可以任意小，但当非零基础行动中最大与最小期望奖励之比至多为$L$时，我们建立了相对于第一最佳剩余的$\Theta(1/\log L)$的收入保证。我们还将策略性披露下的效用和福利与经典模型中的对应值进行比较。最后，我们将代理人的$1/e$效用保证扩展到一般结果空间，而不限制委托人使用线性合同。我们的结果表明，策略性行动空间披露如何改变剩余的分配，同时在代理人最优披露下保持常数因子的福利保证。
英文摘要
We study strategic disclosure of the action space in principal-agent contracting, where an agent selects a disclosed action set to shape the principal's perception of her capabilities before contract design. Unaware of the strategic disclosure, the principal designs a revenue-optimal contract as if the disclosed action set were complete and accurate. We consider two variants distinguished by cost verifiability. When costs are unverifiable, the agent can extract the entire first-best surplus, leaving the principal with zero revenue. When costs are verifiable, we characterize the agent's optimal disclosure strategy in binary-outcome settings and, more generally, when the principal is restricted to linear contracts, reducing the agent's problem to a two-variable convex optimization problem. We prove that the agent can secure utility of at least a $1/e$ fraction of the first-best surplus, which also yields a $1/e$ welfare guarantee under optimal disclosure. While the principal's revenue can be arbitrarily small compared to the first-best surplus, when the ratio of maximum to minimum expected reward among non-null base actions is at most $L$, we establish a revenue guarantee of $Θ(1/\log L)$ relative to the first-best surplus. We also compare utilities and welfare under strategic disclosure with their counterparts in the canonical model. Finally, we extend the agent's $1/e$ utility guarantee to general outcome spaces without restricting the principal to linear contracts. Our results show how strategic action-space disclosure changes the distribution of surplus while preserving a constant-factor welfare guarantee under the agent's optimal disclosure.
CommentsFull version of the manuscript accepted at WINE 2026. A one-page extended abstract will appear in the conference proceedings. A substantially revised version with more general results is planned
