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arXiv 2610.15087econ.TH
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防联盟披露

Coalition-Proof Disclosure

Princeton University(普林斯顿大学);Vanderbilt University(范德堡大学)

Germán Gieczewski, Maria Titova

AI总结:

本文研究具有类型无关偏好的知情发送者的广义可验证披露,刻画防联盟均衡的特征,证明其可能不存在并确立存在性条件,还分析了随机证据下丰富披露博弈的事前收益结构。

摘要:

我们研究具有类型无关偏好的知情发送者的广义可验证披露问题。我们首先将所有完美贝叶斯均衡刻画为发送者类型的个体理性划分,这些划分按收益排序形成联盟。若没有一组类型能通过协调发布一则声明(该声明会被接收者恰好解读为来自愿意加入该联盟的类型)而获利,则该均衡通过我们的防联盟性准则。防联盟均衡是贪婪的划分:每一步中,剩余类型的联盟都能获得与均衡一致的最高收益。鉴于我们设定的一般性,防联盟均衡可能不存在。我们在偏好和证据的限制下确立了存在性:消息完备下的拟凹性、中间性、消息完备下的廉价磋商以及收益退化。对于具有随机证据的丰富披露博弈,我们证明发送者在防联盟均衡中的事前收益是信念单纯形上的分段线性帐篷,类似于贝叶斯说服中的凹闭包和廉价磋商中的拟凹闭包。

英文摘要:

We study generalized verifiable disclosure by a sender with type-independent preferences. We first characterize all perfect Bayesian equilibria as partitions of the sender's types into coalitions ordered by payoff. An equilibrium survives our coalition-proofness criterion if no group of types can profitably coordinate an announced deviation that only they are able and willing to join. Coalition-proof equilibria are greedy partitions: at each step, a coalition of the remaining types attains the highest payoff consistent with equilibrium. In our general setting, coalition-proof equilibria may fail to exist. We establish existence under restrictions on preferences and evidence: quasiconcavity with message completeness, betweenness, cheap talk with message completeness, and payoff degradation. For a disclosure game with maximally rich evidence, we show that the sender's ex-ante payoff in a coalition-proof equilibrium is a piecewise linear tent over the belief simplex, analogous to the concave closure in Bayesian persuasion and the quasiconcave closure in cheap talk.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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