有限行动证据对策的均衡加细
Equilibrium Refinement in Finite Action Evidence Games
摘要:
证据博弈研究的是发送者通过选择性地披露关于世界未知状态的确凿证据来说服接收者的情况。证据博弈通常有多重均衡。Hart et al.(2017)提出关注真相倾向均衡,即,完美的贝叶斯均衡,发送者在无所谓时如实披露,而接收者则按面值接受偏离路径的披露。他们表明,倾向于真相的均衡是一个扰动博弈的均衡,其中发送者有一个无穷小的奖励说实话。我们证明了,当接收者的行动空间是有限的,真理倾向均衡可能不存在,它不等价于扰动博弈的均衡。为了恢复存在,我们引入了一个干扰的游戏,一个小的不确定性接收器的回报。一个可净化的真实均衡是受干扰博弈中一系列倾向于真实的均衡在干扰收敛到零时的极限。它的存在和特点是一个简单的表征。一个倾向于真理的均衡,也是可净化的真理,是扰动博弈的均衡。此外,可净化的真实均衡是接收者最优的,并给予接收者与最优确定性机制相同的回报。
英文摘要:
Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on truth-leaning equilibria, i.e., perfect Bayesian equilibria where the sender discloses truthfully when indifferent, and the receiver takes off-path disclosure at face value. They show that a truth-leaning equilibrium is an equilibrium of a perturbed game where the sender has an infinitesimal reward for truth-telling. We show that, when the receiver's action space is finite, truth-leaning equilibrium may fail to exist, and it is not equivalent to equilibrium of the perturbed game. To restore existence, we introduce a disturbed game with a small uncertainty about the receiver's payoff. A purifiable truthful equilibrium is the limit of a sequence of truth-leaning equilibria in the disturbed games as the disturbances converge to zero. It exists and features a simple characterization. A truth-leaning equilibrium that is also purifiable truthful is an equilibrium of the perturbed game. Moreover, purifiable truthful equilibria are receiver optimal and give the receiver the same payoff as the optimal deterministic mechanism.
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