无限扩展形式游戏中的序均衡
Sequential Equilibria in a Class of Infinite Extensive Form Games
AI总结:
本文研究了一类无限扩展形式游戏中的序均衡,定义了连续信息的序均衡概念,证明了其存在性并扩展了纳什均衡。
摘要:
序均衡是扩展形式游戏纳什均衡的重要精炼概念。然而,它未定义于玩家可选择连续动作的扩展形式游戏。本文定义了一类无限扩展形式游戏,其中信息随过去动作连续变化,并为此类游戏定义了自然的序均衡概念。序均衡存在于此类游戏并精炼纳什均衡。在标准有限扩展形式游戏中,本文定义与传统序均衡概念一致。
英文摘要:
Sequential equilibrium is one of the most fundamental refinements of Nash equilibrium for games in extensive form. However, it is not defined for extensive-form games in which a player can choose among a continuum of actions. We define a class of infinite extensive form games in which information behaves continuously as a function of past actions and define a natural notion of sequential equilibrium for this class. Sequential equilibria exist in this class and refine Nash equilibria. In standard finite extensive-form games, our definition selects the same strategy profiles as the traditional notion of sequential equilibrium.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。