arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2604.25784econ.TH
收藏

无限扩展形式游戏中的序均衡

Sequential Equilibria in a Class of Infinite Extensive Form Games

CEPS, ENS Paris-Saclay(巴黎萨克雷高等师范学院经济中心);Free University of Bozen-Bolzano(博尔扎诺自由大学);University of Vienna(维也纳大学)

Michael Greinecker, Martin Meier, Konrad Podczeck

AI总结:

本文研究了一类无限扩展形式游戏中的序均衡,定义了连续信息的序均衡概念,证明了其存在性并扩展了纳什均衡。

摘要:

序均衡是扩展形式游戏纳什均衡的重要精炼概念。然而,它未定义于玩家可选择连续动作的扩展形式游戏。本文定义了一类无限扩展形式游戏,其中信息随过去动作连续变化,并为此类游戏定义了自然的序均衡概念。序均衡存在于此类游戏并精炼纳什均衡。在标准有限扩展形式游戏中,本文定义与传统序均衡概念一致。

英文摘要:

Sequential equilibrium is one of the most fundamental refinements of Nash equilibrium for games in extensive form. However, it is not defined for extensive-form games in which a player can choose among a continuum of actions. We define a class of infinite extensive form games in which information behaves continuously as a function of past actions and define a natural notion of sequential equilibrium for this class. Sequential equilibria exist in this class and refine Nash equilibria. In standard finite extensive-form games, our definition selects the same strategy profiles as the traditional notion of sequential equilibrium.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑