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arXiv 2202.06479econ.TH
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部分信息下贝叶斯说服中的承诺顺序

Order of Commitments in Bayesian Persuasion with Partial-informed Senders

Shih-Tang Su, Vijay G. Subramanian

摘要:

承诺的权力区分贝叶斯说服问题从其他游戏(战略)沟通。具有多个目标的说服博弈主要研究了同时承诺和信号设置。然而,许多现实世界中的多个实例具有顺序信令。在这种情况下,承诺也可以按顺序做出,然后由发送者发出承诺的顺序-发送者首先或最后发出信号-可以显着影响均衡收益和策略。对于一个两个发送者的说服游戏,其中的代理人部分地知道世界的状态,我们找到了必要和充分的条件,以确定何时不同的承诺订单产生不同的收益配置文件。特别是,对于两个发送者设置,我们表明,如果两个属性成立,则会出现不同的收益曲线:1)两个发送者愿意在某些状态下合作说服接收者;以及2)发送者第二次发送信号可以在第一次提交时进行可信的威胁,从而使其他发送者设计信号的空间受到限制。

英文摘要:

The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely studied simultaneous commitment and signalling settings. However, many real-world instances with multiple senders have sequential signalling. In such contexts, commitments can also be made sequentially, and then the order of commitment by the senders -- the sender signalling last committing first or last -- could significantly impact the equilibrium payoffs and strategies. For a two-sender persuasion game where the senders are partially aware of the state of the world, we find necessary and sufficient conditions to determine when different commitment orders yield different payoff profiles. In particular, for the two-sender setting, we show that different payoff profiles arise if two properties hold: 1) the two senders are willing to collaborate in persuading the receiver in some state(s); and 2) the sender signalling second can carry out a credible threat when committing first such that the other sender's room to design signals gets constrained.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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