贝叶斯说服中信息剩余的获取
Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion
摘要：
贝叶斯说服模型研究了信息发送者和接收者之间的沟通，强调发送者从其信息优势中获取最大剩余的能力。在本文中，我们研究了一个设置与多个发送者，但在其中接收者只与一个发送者的他的选择：发送者提交的信号和接收器，然后选择，在过渡阶段，与发送者进行交互。我们的主要结果是，只要双方对彼此的偏好有一点点不确定，接收者就会在这个博弈的所有均衡中获得所有的信息盈余。
英文摘要：
The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper we study a setting with multiple senders, but in which the receiver interacts with only one sender of his choice: senders commit to signals and the receiver then chooses, at the interim stage, with which sender to interact. Our main result is that whenever senders are even slightly uncertain about each other's preferences, the receiver receives all the informational surplus in all equilibria of this game.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
