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arXiv 2503.06007econ.TH
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支付与说服

Paying and Persuading

Massachusetts Institute of Technology(麻省理工学院)

Daniel Luo

AI总结:

本文研究了动态合同问题,探讨了发送者如何通过支付和说服来激励接收者。研究发现,支付和说服都是激励机制,而最优合同中支付仅在发送者承诺在每个延续历史中揭示状态之后发生。

摘要:

我研究了动态合同问题,其中发送者私下观察一个马尔可夫状态,并试图激励行动的接收者。发送者通过两种方式提供激励:支付,这会改变事后支付,以及(贝叶斯)说服,这会塑造接收者关于支付的中间信念。对于所有阶段游戏支付、贴现率和马尔可夫转换规则,转移是最后的手段——存在一个最优合同,其中支付仅在发送者承诺在每个延续历史中揭示状态之后发生。在示例中,最优合同是一种忠诚计划:发送者选择静态最优的信息结构,直到随机促销时间,之后发送者揭示状态并支付接收者。

英文摘要:

I study dynamic contracting where Sender privately observes a Markovian state and seeks to motivate Receiver, who acts. Sender provides incentives in two ways: payments, which alter payoffs ex-post, and (Bayesian) persuasion, which shapes Receiver interim beliefs about payoffs. For all stage game payoffs, discount rates, and Markov transition rules, transfers are a last resort--there is an optimal contract where payments occur only after Sender commits to reveal the state at every continuation history. In an example, the optimal contract is a loyalty program: Sender chooses the static optimal information structure until a random promotion time, after which Sender reveals the state and pays Receiver.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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