说服一个一厢情愿的思考者
Persuading a Wishful Thinker
AI总结：
本文研究发送者如何设计信息结构来说服一个系统性过度乐观的非贝叶斯接收者，并证明当发送者不确定接收者心中的最佳结果时，最优说服结构相比贝叶斯情形会发生质的改变。
摘要：
我们研究一个说服问题，其中发送者设计一种信息结构，以诱导一个非贝叶斯接收者采取特定行动。该接收者私下了解自己的偏好，是一个一厢情愿的思考者：他系统性地对最有利的结果过度乐观。我们表明，当发送者不确定接收者在其决策问题中所感知的最佳结果是什么时，与贝叶斯情形相比，一厢情愿的思维会导致最优说服结构发生质的变化。
英文摘要：
We study a persuasion problem in which a sender designs an information structure to induce a non-Bayesian receiver to take a particular action. The receiver, who is privately informed about his preferences, is a wishful thinker: he is systematically overoptimistic about the most favorable outcomes. We show that wishful thinking can lead to a qualitative shift in the structure of optimal persuasion compared to the Bayesian case, whenever the sender is uncertain about what the receiver perceives as the best-case outcome in his decision problem.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
