说服一部分听众
Persuading part of an audience
摘要:
我提出了一个廉价的谈话模式,发送者可以使用私人信息,只关心说服她的观众的子集。例如,候选人只需要说服大多数选民就可以赢得选举。我发现,通过对一些接受者说实话,同时对另一些人撒谎,谎言可以获得可信度。在一般情况下,该模型允许信息传输在平衡的一些先验信念。当发送者需要说服的受众的比例足够小时,发送者可以近似于她喜欢的结果。我描述了发送者最优均衡以及在可分离的环境中不必说服所有受众的好处。我还分析了不同的应用,并验证了结果对模型的一些扰动是鲁棒的,包括Crawford和Sobel(1982)中的非透明动机,以及Kamenica和Gentzkow(2011)中的完全承诺。
英文摘要:
I propose a cheap-talk model in which the sender can use private messages and only cares about persuading a subset of her audience. For example, a candidate only needs to persuade a majority of the electorate in order to win an election. I find that senders can gain credibility by speaking truthfully to some receivers while lying to others. In general settings, the model admits information transmission in equilibrium for some prior beliefs. The sender can approximate her preferred outcome when the fraction of the audience she needs to persuade is sufficiently small. I characterize the sender-optimal equilibrium and the benefit of not having to persuade your whole audience in separable environments. I also analyze different applications and verify that the results are robust to some perturbations of the model, including non-transparent motives as in Crawford and Sobel (1982), and full commitment as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。