AI 中文总结
该研究构建了鲁棒贝叶斯说服的公理模型，针对发送方无法完全控制接收方信息的情况，以最坏情况信息泄漏建模，涵盖多种信息泄漏示例并展开探究。
AI 中文摘要
我们构建了鲁棒贝叶斯说服的公理模型，其中发送方无法完全控制接收方可获得的信息。发送方选定信息结构后，预期可能会有更具信息量的结构被实施，我们通过允许发送方在最坏情况信息泄漏（由一组更具信息量的结构表示）下评估每个信息结构来对此建模。该模型涵盖了广泛的信息泄漏示例，我们也对这些示例进行了探究。
英文摘要
We develop an axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion where the sender cannot fully control the information available to the receiver. After selecting an information structure, the sender expects that more informative structures might be implemented. We model this by allowing the sender to assess each information structure under worst-case information leakage, represented by a set of more informative structures. The model encompasses a wide range of examples of information leakage, which we also explore.
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