重复沟通与隐私欺骗成本

摘要：

我研究了一个耐心的发送者和一系列接收者之间的重复通信游戏。发送者有关于他说谎的心理成本的持久的私人信息，并且在每个时期，可以私下观察i.i.d.的实现。在沟通发生之前。我描述了每种发送者的最高均衡收益。当受信者先验信念支持下的最高说谎成本接近发送者说谎收益时，重复沟通博弈中每种类型的最高均衡收益收敛于一次性贝叶斯说服博弈中的均衡收益。我还证明了，在每一个发送者最优均衡中，没有一种发送者在每一个历史记录中都会在说实话和撒谎之间徘徊。当存在说谎成本大于收益的道德类型时，我给出了所有非道德类型说谎者获得最优承诺收益的充分必要条件。我确定了一个外部选项的影响，通过道德的可能性降低每一个非道德类型的回报。

英文摘要：

I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and in every period, can privately observe the realization of an i.i.d. state before communication takes place. I characterize every type of sender's highest equilibrium payoff. When the highest lying cost in the support of the receivers' prior belief approaches the sender's benefit from lying, every type's highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated communication game converges to his equilibrium payoff in a one-shot Bayesian persuasion game. I also show that in every sender-optimal equilibrium, no type of sender mixes between telling the truth and lying at every history. When there exist ethical types whose lying costs outweigh their benefits, I provide necessary and sufficient conditions for all non-ethical type senders to attain their optimal commitment payoffs. I identify an outside option effect through which the possibility of being ethical decreases every non-ethical type's payoff.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。