合理推理的AI代理可以在零样本情况下避免博弈论失败并得到证明
Reasonably reasoning AI agents can avoid game-theoretic failures in zero-shot, provably
AI总结:
本文研究了AI代理在重复博弈中的稳定性,证明了基于贝叶斯后验采样的代理能趋近纳什均衡,且在未知收益情况下仍保持收敛性。
摘要:
随着自主AI代理越来越多地调解在线平台市场,一个基本问题浮现:这些市场能否产生稳定的战略结果?在重复战略环境中,纳什均衡提供了稳定性的一个自然基准。然而,现有LLM代理的实证证据混杂,不清楚独立部署的代理是否能在无显式战略后训练的情况下收敛到均衡行为。本文提供肯定答案。扩展理论经济学中的贝叶斯学习文献,我们证明AI代理作为贝叶斯后验采样者而非预期效用最大化者,能够保证在无限重复博弈中最终趋近纳什均衡。我们进一步将此分析扩展到阶段收益事先未知的情况,且代理只能观察到其私人实现的随机收益,仍获得相同的收敛保证。最后,我们在五个重复博弈环境中经验性评估这些理论影响,从囚徒困境到营销推广游戏。综合来看,我们的发现表明,AI调解市场中的战略稳定性可以来自现代AI代理的内在推理和学习特性,而无需不现实的普遍微调。
英文摘要:
As autonomous AI agents increasingly mediate online platform markets, a fundamental question emerges: do these markets generate stable strategic outcomes? In repeated strategic environments, the Nash equilibrium provides a natural benchmark for this stability. However, empirical evidence on off-the-shelf LLM agents is mixed, leaving it unclear whether independently deployed agents can converge to equilibrium behavior without explicit strategic post-training. In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer. Extending the Bayesian learning literature in theoretical economics, we prove that AI agents, acting as Bayesian posterior samplers rather than expected utility maximizers, are guaranteed to eventually become weakly close to a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games. We further extend this analysis to settings in which stage payoffs are unknown ex ante, and agents observe only their privately realized stochastic payoffs, and obtain the same convergence guarantees. Finally, we empirically evaluate these theoretical implications across five repeated-game environments, ranging from the Prisoner's Dilemma to marketing promotion games. Taken together, our findings suggest that strategic stability in AI-mediated markets can emerge from the intrinsic reasoning and learning properties of modern AI agents, without the need for unrealistic universal fine-tuning.
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