信任与背叛：声誉回报与无承诺行为
Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment
摘要：
我研究了一个重复的游戏，在这个游戏中，一个有耐心的玩家（例如，卖方）想要赢得一些短视的对手的信任（例如，但可以从背叛他们中严格获益。她从背叛中得到的好处是绝对积极的，是她持续的私人信息。我描述了每种耐心参与者的最高均衡收益。她持续的私人信息只会通过支持她的对手的先前信念的最低收益来影响这个收益。我还表明，在每一个均衡，这是最佳的病人的球员，她的路径上的行为是不稳定的，她的长期行动频率被钉在所有，除了两种类型。从概念上讲，我的收益型方法包含了一个现实的关注，即没有任何类型的声誉建设的球员是免疫的食言诱惑。与承诺型模型相比，所有类型的耐心参与者的激励约束导致她的最高可达到的收益和新颖的预测，她的行为尖锐的特点。
英文摘要：
I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest equilibrium payoff. Her persistent private information affects this payoff only through the lowest benefit in the support of her opponents' prior belief. I also show that in every equilibrium which is optimal for the patient player, her on-path behavior is nonstationary, and her long-run action frequencies are pinned down for all except two types. Conceptually, my payoff-type approach incorporates a realistic concern that no type of reputation-building player is immune to reneging temptations. Compared to commitment-type models, the incentive constraints for all types of patient player lead to a sharp characterization of her highest attainable payoff and novel predictions on her behaviors.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
