声誉溢出
Reputational Spillovers
AI总结:
本文研究了一个声誉谈判博弈,分析中心玩家同时与外围玩家谈判时,声誉溢出如何影响策略选择与结果。
摘要:
本文分析了一个声誉谈判博弈,研究中心玩家同时与外围玩家谈判时,声誉溢出如何影响策略选择与结果。每个玩家要么是理性玩家要么是承诺类型,后者从不让步并坚持固定份额,而让步行为是公开观察的。中心玩家的类型是全局的,因此一个纠纷中的行动会更新另一个纠纷中的信念,并产生声誉溢出。该博弈存在唯一均衡,使得与Abreu和Gul(2000)的双边基准进行精确比较成为可能。声誉溢出仅在且仅有当外围玩家最初是唯一最值得信赖的玩家时,才与收益相关。在此情况下,声誉溢出推翻了双边预测,即强硬立场有利:中心玩家从不严格更优,甚至可能更差;最强的外围玩家会输;而最弱的外围玩家可能受益,尤其是在中心的高风险纠纷与另一个外围玩家进行时。
英文摘要:
We analyze a reputational bargaining game in which a central player negotiates simultaneously with two peripheral players. Each player is either rational or a commitment type who never concedes and insists on a fixed share, and concessions are publicly observed. The central player's type is global, so actions in one dispute update beliefs in the other and generate reputational spillovers. The game admits a unique equilibrium, enabling a sharp comparison with the bilateral benchmark of Abreu and Gul (2000). Spillovers are payoff-relevant if and only if a peripheral is uniquely the most reputable player initially. In that case, spillovers overturn the bilateral prediction that toughness pays: the central player is never strictly better off and can be strictly worse off; the strongest peripheral loses; and the weakest peripheral can benefit, especially when the center's higher-stakes dispute is with the other peripheral.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。