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arXiv 2602.23098econ.TH
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沟通与重复博弈的纯化与扰动

Purification and Perturbations of Communication and Repeated Games

Cambridge University(剑桥大学)

Alistair Barton

AI总结:

本文证明,在沟通和重复博弈中,即使代理人有轻微私人偏好,基于与自身收益无关的私人信息来调整策略也是非理性的,并通过扰动方法使这些分析技术与私人偏好兼容。

摘要:

我证明,在沟通和重复博弈中,即使代理人有轻微私人偏好,基于与自身收益无关的私人信息来调整策略也是非理性的,这与分析沟通和重复博弈的强大技术相反。在具有公共+私人监测的重复博弈中,这意味着所有纯均衡都是完美公共均衡,且非平凡的信念自由均衡不存在。在一大类沟通博弈中(直至允许接收者承诺),这意味着在状态无关偏好下说服是不可能的。然而,这些分析技术可以通过扰动方法与私人偏好兼容:考虑私人信息的收益相关性或各方信息之间的相关性。后者的一个例子是通过在重复博弈均衡中引入“赎罪”。

英文摘要:

I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated games. In repeated games with public+private monitoring, this means all pure equilibria are perfect public equilibria, and non-trivial belief free equilibria do not exist. In a wide class of communication games (up to allowing receiver commitment), this means persuasion is impossible with state-independent preferences. Nevertheless, these analytic techniques may be made compatible with private preferences through perturbation approaches: considering either payoff-relevance of the private information or correlation between parties' information. An example of the latter occurs by introducing `atonement' to repeated games equilibria.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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