We study the set of (stationary) feasible payoffs of overlapping generation repeated games that can be achieved by action sequences in which every generation of players plays the same sequence of action profiles. First, we completely characterize the set of feasible payoffs given any fixed discount factor of players and the length of interaction. This allows us to obtain the feasible payoff set in closed form. Second, we provide novel comparative statics of the feasible payoff set with respect to the discount factor and the length of interaction. Interestingly, the feasible payoff set becomes smaller as players' discount factor becomes larger. Additionally, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for this monotonicity to be strict.
A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated Two-Player Games having Computable Strategies with no Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means Payoff
Expectation-enforcing strategies for repeated games
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill（北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校）；NSF-Simons National Institute for Theory and Mathematics in Biology（美国国家科学基金会-西蒙斯生物理论与数学国家研究所）
Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games
SYCAMORE Lab, EPFL - Swiss Federal Technology Institute of Lausanne（洛桑联邦理工学院 S Y C A M O R E 实验室）；Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science（伦敦政治经济学院数学系）；Department of Quantitative Methods, CUNEF Universidad（CUNEF 大学定量方法系）
