arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2007.14002econ.TH
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重复博弈中的均衡行为

Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games

Yingkai Li, Harry Pei

摘要:

我们研究一个耐心的球员的行为时,他可以建立声誉在前面的一系列短视的对手。在正概率的情况下,耐心参与者是一个承诺型的参与者,他在每个阶段都采取他的Stackelberg行动。我们的特点是病人的球员的行动频率在平衡。我们的研究结果澄清了声誉可以在多大程度上改善患者的行为,并提供新的见解进入威慑,商业交易和资本税收。通过建立一个新的浓度不等式,我们的证明做出了方法上的贡献。

英文摘要:

We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player's action frequencies in equilibrium. Our results clarify the extent to which reputations can refine the patient player's behavior and provide new insights to entry deterrence, business transactions, and capital taxation. Our proof makes a methodological contribution by establishing a new concentration inequality.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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