We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player's action frequencies in equilibrium. Our results clarify the extent to which reputations can refine the patient player's behavior and provide new insights to entry deterrence, business transactions, and capital taxation. Our proof makes a methodological contribution by establishing a new concentration inequality.
A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated Two-Player Games having Computable Strategies with no Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means Payoff
Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games
SYCAMORE Lab, EPFL - Swiss Federal Technology Institute of Lausanne(洛桑联邦理工学院 S Y C A M O R E 实验室);Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science(伦敦政治经济学院数学系);Department of Quantitative Methods, CUNEF Universidad(CUNEF 大学定量方法系)
Expectation-enforcing strategies for repeated games
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill(北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校);NSF-Simons National Institute for Theory and Mathematics in Biology(美国国家科学基金会-西蒙斯生物理论与数学国家研究所)
Characterisation of reactive Nash equilibria in repeated additive games
Interdisciplinary Transformation University, Linz, Austria(林茨跨学科转型大学);RIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe, Japan(日本神户理化学研究所计算科学中心);RIKEN Center for Interdisciplinary Theoretical and Mathematical Science (iTHEMS), Wako, Japan(日本和光理化学研究所交叉理论与数学科学中心)