贝叶斯劝说中的信息量与信任
Informativeness and Trust in Bayesian Persuasion
AI总结:
研究贝叶斯劝说中发送方与接收方的交互,通过线性规划刻画Stackelberg博弈值与信任约束,定义并量化发送方信息量,推广了确定性策略下的先前工作。
摘要:
劝说策略只有在其信息的设计方式让智能体确信选择特定行动符合其自身最大利益时,才能成功说服该智能体采取该行动。因此,是什么让智能体信任劝说者的建议是一个自然的问题。我们研究发送方与接收方之间的贝叶斯劝说交互,其中发送方拥有私有信息,接收方试图从发送方发送的消息中恢复这些信息。发送方精心构造这些消息以最大化其效用,该效用取决于源符号和接收方恢复的符号。我们的目标是刻画Stackelberg博弈值(SGV),以及发送方在劝说过程中揭示的真实信息量。我们发现,SGV由一个线性规划在受特定信任约束限制的概率分布上的最优值给出。这些约束编码了劝说策略中的任何信号必须包含比虚假更多的真实信息,从而对发送方能进行的混淆程度施加了基本限制。我们将发送方的信息量定义为在ε-均衡劝说策略序列的任何聚点中,发送方真实揭示的最小期望符号数,并证明它由另一个线性规划给出。信息量是发送方为说服接收方必须揭示的信息量的基本界限。对于结构化效用函数,给出了SGV和信息量的闭式表达式。这项工作推广了我们之前的工作,在之前的工作中发送方和接收方被限制只能采取确定性策略,并刻画了类似的信息量概念。讨论了先前和当前概念之间的比较。
英文摘要:
A persuasion policy successfully persuades an agent to pick a particular action only if the information is designed in a manner that convinces the agent that it is in their best interest to pick that action. Thus, it is natural to ask, what makes the agent trust the persuader's suggestion? We study a Bayesian persuasion interaction between a sender and a receiver where the sender has access to private information and the receiver attempts to recover this information from messages sent by the sender. The sender crafts these messages in an attempt to maximize its utility which depends on the source symbol and the symbol recovered by the receiver. Our goal is to characterize the \textit{Stackelberg game value}, and the amount of true information revealed by the sender during persuasion. We find that the SGV is given by the optimal value of a \textit{linear program} on probability distributions constrained by certain \textit{trust constraints}. These constraints encode that any signal in a persuasion strategy must contain more truth than untruth and thus impose a fundamental bound on the extent of obfuscation a sender can perform. We define \textit{informativeness} of the sender as the minimum expected number of symbols truthfully revealed by the sender in any accumulation point of a sequence of $\varepsilon$-equilibrium persuasion strategies, and show that it is given by another linear program. Informativeness is a fundamental bound on the amount of information the sender must reveal to persuade a receiver. Closed form expressions for the SGV and the informativeness are presented for structured utility functions. This work generalizes our previous work where the sender and the receiver were constrained to play only deterministic strategies and a similar notion of informativeness was characterized. Comparisons between the previous and current notions are discussed.
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