保持信任：贝叶斯说服的动态模型
Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion
摘要：
我们考虑一个动态模型的贝叶斯说服信息需要时间，是昂贵的发送者生成和接收器处理，既不能承诺他们未来的行动。在这个博弈的马尔可夫完美均衡（MPE）中，说服可能完全崩溃。然而，对于说服成本足够小的情况，民间定理的一个版本成立：当成本消失时，在MPE中获得了接近Kamenica和Gentzkow（2011）的发送者最优说服以及完全揭示和两者之间的所有结果。
英文摘要：
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)'s sender-optimal persuasion as well as full revelation and everything in between are obtained in MPE, as the cost vanishes.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
