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arXiv 1903.09055econ.TH
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缓慢说服

Slow persuasion

Matteo Escudé, Ludvig Sinander

AI总结:

本文在动态模型中引入渐进性约束,利用粘性动态规划原理刻画最优缓慢说服策略,发现该约束会抑制信息提供,且即使偏好一致也可能只提供部分信息。

摘要:

当信息只能缓慢生成时,最优说服的价值与形式是什么?我们在一个动态模型中研究这一问题:一个“发送者”在渐进性约束下随时间提供公共信息,而决策者在每个时期采取一个行动。利用一种新颖的“粘性”动态规划原理,我们刻画了发送者的均衡价值函数与信息提供。我们表明,渐进性约束相对于无约束说服抑制了信息提供。这一差距可能很大,但随着约束放松而缩小。与无约束说服相反,即使参与者偏好一致但先验信念不同,也可能提供非完全信息。

英文摘要:

What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel 'viscosity' dynamic programming principle, we characterise the sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substantial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less-than-full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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