说服中的双侧合理性约束
Two-Sided Plausibility Constraints in Persuasion
AI总结:
本文研究说服中的双侧合理性约束,刻画其充分条件,发现状态具正密度时仅区间划分信息下约束充分,并将该结论用于推导二级价格拍卖的最优对称披露规则。
摘要:
拥有承诺能力的发送方向已掌握信息的接收方提供额外信息。最终后验均值必须在凸序下比初始均值更分散,且比状态本身更不分散。我们刻画了这两个合理性约束何时也是充分的,即所有满足这些约束的分布都可被诱导。若状态具有正密度,当且仅当采用区间划分信息时,这两个约束是充分的:接收方会获知划分中包含状态的区间,且仅获知此信息,区间可以是单个点。否则,即使发送方观察到接收方的信息,仍存在非空开集的分布满足两个约束却无法被诱导。我们利用充分情形推导了二级价格拍卖中的最优对称披露规则,其中竞拍者初始知晓估值区间。
英文摘要:
A sender with commitment provides additional information to an already informed receiver. Final posterior means must be more dispersed than initial means and less dispersed than the state, in convex order. We characterize when these two plausibility constraints are also sufficient, so that every distribution satisfying them can be induced. If the state has a positive density, they are sufficient exactly under interval-partition information: the receiver learns which interval of a partition contains the state and nothing more, where an interval may be a single point. Otherwise, a nonempty open set of distributions satisfying both constraints cannot be induced, even when the sender observes the receiver's information. We use the sufficient case to derive an optimal symmetric disclosure rule in a second-price auction where bidders initially know valuation intervals.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。