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arXiv 2510.20907econ.TH
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凸函数区间的经济学

The Economics of Convex Function Intervals

University of Bonn(波恩大学)

Victor Augias, Lina Uhe

AI总结:

本文提出凸函数区间(CFIs)作为经济设计中的约束集,刻画其极端点、给出线性规划最优性条件及嵌套优化方法,并应用于筛选、委托、竞赛和说服问题,揭示更好外部选项扩大委托集等新经济含义。

摘要:

我们引入了凸函数区间(CFIs):满足给定水平和斜率约束的凸函数族。CFIs 自然地作为经济设计中的约束集出现,包括具有类型依赖参与约束和双边(弱)优序约束的问题。我们的主要结果包括:(i)CFIs 极端点的几何刻画;(ii)CFIs 上线性规划的充分最优性条件;(iii)在其下水平边界上进行嵌套优化的方法,该方法可应用于例如外部选项的最优设计。我们将这些结果应用于四个场景:具有类型依赖外部选项的筛选和委托问题、有限处置的竞赛设计,以及具有信息性约束的基于均值的说服。我们利用我们的工具得出了若干新颖的经济学含义。例如,我们表明更好的外部选项导致更大的委托集,并且在具有非平凡、类型依赖参与约束的经典垄断筛选问题中,标价机制可能是次优的。

英文摘要:

We introduce convex function intervals (CFIs): families of convex functions satisfying given level and slope constraints. CFIs naturally arise as constraint sets in economic design, including problems with type-dependent participation constraints and two-sided (weak) majorization constraints. Our main results include: (i) a geometric characterization of the extreme points of CFIs; (ii) sufficient optimality conditions for linear programs over CFIs; and (iii) methods for nested optimization on their lower level boundary that can be applied, e.g., to the optimal design of outside options. We apply these results to four settings: screening and delegation problems with type-dependent outside options, contest design with limited disposal, and mean-based persuasion with informativeness constraints. We draw several novel economic implications using our tools. For instance, we show that better outside options lead to larger delegation sets, and that posted price mechanisms can be suboptimal in the canonical monopolistic screening problem with nontrivial, type-dependent participation constraints.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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