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arXiv 2402.06765econ.TH
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完美贝叶斯说服

Perfect Bayesian Persuasion

Elliot Lipnowski, Doron Ravid, Denis Shishkin

AI总结:

本文研究了发送者承诺实验以说服接收者的场景,在考虑实验选择激励且不预设接收者平局规则的情况下,刻画了发送者均衡收益唯一的条件,并证明该唯一性对不完美承诺具有稳健性。

摘要:

发送者承诺进行一项实验以说服接收者。考虑到发送者的实验选择激励,且不预设接收者在无差异时的平局决胜规则,我们刻画了发送者的均衡收益何时是唯一的,从而与其“贝叶斯说服”价值相一致。有限模型中的一个充分条件是,每个在某个信念下是接收者最优的行动,在另一个信念下也是唯一最优的——这是一个通用性质。我们同样表明,在有序模型中,发送者的均衡收益通常是唯一的。在一个扩展中,我们表明唯一性产生了对不完美发送者承诺的稳健性。

英文摘要:

A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is unique and so coincides with her "Bayesian persuasion" value. A sufficient condition in finite models is that every action which is receiver-optimal at some belief is uniquely optimal at some other belief -- a generic property. We similarly show the equilibrium sender payoff is typically unique in ordered models. In an extension, we show uniqueness generates robustness to imperfect sender commitment.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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