模糊说服的隐蔽化研究
A Concavification Approach to Ambiguous Persuasion
摘要:
这篇文章表明,Beauchene,Li和Li(2019)中描述的模糊说服的价值可以通过贝叶斯说服中的凹化程序来给出(Kamenica和Gentzkow,2011)。此外,它意味着一个模糊的说服游戏可以等价地形式化为贝叶斯说服游戏通过扭曲的效用函数。这个结果是在一个新的模糊说服结构下得到的。
英文摘要:
This note shows that the value of ambiguous persuasion characterized in Beauchene, Li and Li(2019) can be given by a concavification program as in Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). In addition, it implies that an ambiguous persuasion game can be equivalently formalized as a Bayesian persuasion game by distorting the utility functions. This result is obtained under a novel construction of ambiguous persuasion.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。