妥协,不要优化:推广完美贝叶斯均衡以允许模糊性
Compromise, Don't Optimize: Generalizing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to Allow for Ambiguity
摘要:
我们介绍了一个解决方案的概念,在不完全信息的广泛形式的游戏中,玩家不需要分配的可能性,他们不知道的游戏。这是嵌入在一个模型中,其中的球员可以持有多个先验。玩家通过寻找妥协来做出选择,以在每个更新的先验知识下产生良好的性能。我们的解决方案概念被称为完美妥协均衡。它推广了完美贝叶斯均衡。我们展示了它如何处理在古诺和伯特兰市场,公共品规定,斯宾塞的就业市场信号,双边贸易的共同价值,和预测的模糊性。
英文摘要:
We introduce a solution concept for extensive-form games of incomplete information in which players need not assign likelihoods to what they do not know about the game. This is embedded in a model in which players can hold multiple priors. Players make choices by looking for compromises that yield a good performance under each of their updated priors. Our solution concept is called perfect compromise equilibrium. It generalizes perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We show how it deals with ambiguity in Cournot and Bertrand markets, public good provision, Spence's job market signaling, bilateral trade with common value, and forecasting.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。