中介说服
Mediated Persuasion
摘要：
我们研究了一个战略信息设计博弈，其中发送者选择状态相关的信息结构，调解者可以混淆这些结构生成的信号，而接收者在观察到前两个参与者生成的信号后采取行动。我们充分的条件特征的信息披露，比较结果和没有一个调解人，并提供比较静态分析方面的发送者和调解人的喜好。我们还提供了新的概念和计算的见解，发送者可以诱导的一组可行的后验信念，并使用这些结果来获得有关均衡结果的见解。发送者永远不会从中介中受益，而接收者可能会。引人注目的是，当中介者的偏好与她的偏好不完全一致时，接收者会受益;相反，中介者应该比发送者更喜欢更多的信息披露，但不太完美的披露。
英文摘要：
We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after observing the signal generated by the first two players. We characterize sufficient conditions for information revelation, compare outcomes with and without a mediator and provide comparative statics with regard to the preferences of the sender and the mediator. We also provide novel conceptual and computational insights about the set of feasible posterior beliefs that the sender can induce, and use these results to obtain insights about equilibrium outcomes. The sender never benefits from mediation, while the receiver might. Strikingly, the receiver benefits when the mediator's preferences are not perfectly aligned with hers; rather the mediator should prefer more information revelation than the sender, but less than perfect revelation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
