零和博弈中的竞争说服者
Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games
摘要：
我们研究贝叶斯说服与多个有条件的独立实验（和可能的其他人）。发送者对所披露的信息具有零和偏好。我们的特点时，任何一组状态可以汇集在平衡，当所有的平衡是充分揭示。当且仅当发送方效用函数是“全局非线性”时，状态在每个均衡中完全显露。对于两个状态，这等价于一些具有非平凡偏好的发送者。其结果是，“大多数”零和发送者的偏好导致充分披露。我们探讨了什么样的条件是重要的竞争，导致这种赤裸裸的信息披露。
英文摘要：
We study Bayesian Persuasion with multiple senders who have access to conditionally independent experiments (and possibly others). Senders have zero-sum preferences over information revealed. We characterize when any set of states can be pooled in equilibrium and when all equilibria are fully revealing. The state is fully revealed in every equilibrium if and only if sender utility functions are `globally nonlinear'. With two states, this is equivalent to some sender having nontrivial preferences. The upshot is that `most' zero-sum sender preferences result in full revelation. We explore what conditions are important for competition to result in such stark information revelation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
