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arXiv 2403.03317econ.TH
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代理博弈中的竞争机制:理论与实验

Competing Mechanisms in Games Played Through Agents: Theory and Experiment

Seungjin Han, Andrew Leal

AI总结:

本文提出CMGPTA模型扩展GPTA框架,通过DRMs识别均衡配置,并经实验证明代理人多如实报告偏离者身份,虚假报告共谋概率从9%升至近20%且组间差异显著。

摘要:

本文提出了代理博弈竞争机制(CMGPTA),作为GPTA(Prat和Rustichini(2003))的扩展,其中委托人可以提供任意机制,为每个代理人规定基于所有代理人消息的转移支付计划。我们使用路径上的偏离者报告机制(DRMs)和路径外的单一转移支付计划来识别均衡配置集。我们设计了一个实现DRMs的实验室实验。我们观察到,实现的结果有效的情况比随机情况更频繁。大多数时候,尽管存在通过(默契)共谋进行虚假报告的潜在收益,代理人确实会如实报告偏离委托人的身份。随着博弈的进行,代理人学会了与对手代理人博弈,各组间虚假报告共谋的平均预测概率从实验开始时的约9%增加到实验结束时的略低于20%。然而,组间异质性显著。

英文摘要:

This paper proposes Competing Mechanism Games Played Through Agent (CMGPTA), an extension of the GPTA (Prat and Rustichini (2003)), where a Principal can offer any arbitrary mechanism that specifies a transfer schedule for each agent conditional on all Agents' messages. We identify the set of equilibrium allocations using deviator-reporting mechanisms (DRMs) on the path and single transfer schedules off the path. We design a lab experiment implementing DRMs. We observe that implemented outcomes are efficient more often than random. A majority of the time, Agents do tell the truth on the identity of a deviating Principal, despite potential gains from (tacit) collusion on false reports. As play progresses, Agents learn to play with their counterparty Agent with the average predicted probability of collusion on false reports across groups increasing from about 9% at the beginning of the experiment to just under 20% by the end. However, group heterogeneity is significant.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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