可信的说服力

摘要：

我们提出了一个新的概念的可信度贝叶斯说服问题。如果发送者不能在保持消息分发不变的情况下从篡改其消息中获利，则披露策略是可信的。我们发现，披露政策的可信度是等价于一个循环单调性条件，其诱导分布的状态和行动。我们还描述了可信度如何限制了企业家在不同的回报结构下的说服能力。特别是，当发送者的收益是国家独立的，所有的披露政策是可信的。我们将我们的研究结果应用到柠檬市场，并表明，没有有用的信息可以由卖方披露，即使卖方谁可以承诺她的披露政策将完美地揭示她的私人信息，以最大限度地提高利润。

英文摘要：

We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the credibility of a disclosure policy is equivalent to a cyclical monotonicity condition on its induced distribution over states and actions. We also characterize how credibility restricts the Sender's ability to persuade under different payoff structures. In particular, when the sender's payoff is state-independent, all disclosure policies are credible. We apply our results to the market for lemons, and show that no useful information can be credibly disclosed by the seller, even though a seller who can commit to her disclosure policy would perfectly reveal her private information to maximize profit.

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