通过密码学承诺实现可信、真实且两轮（最优）拍卖
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
AI总结：
本文提出利用密码学安全承诺方案，在买家估值满足 MHR 或 α-强正则性条件下，构造出最优、防策略且可信的两轮拍卖，并证明该构造无法推广到正则分布或消除可信性近似误差。
摘要：
我们考虑一个收入最大化卖家向多个买家出售单件物品的问题。Akbarpour 和 Li 的近期工作将可信性形式化为拍卖的一个期望属性，并证明唯一的最优、可信且防策略的拍卖是带保留价的升价拍卖（Akbarpour 和 Li，2019）。相比之下，当买家的估值满足 MHR 条件时，我们证明一个温和的额外假设——密码学安全承诺方案——就足以实现一个简单的两轮拍卖，该拍卖是最优的、防策略的且可信的（即使竞拍者数量只有拍卖师知道）。我们将分析扩展到买家估值对任意 α > 0 满足 α-强正则性的情形，在可信性上可达到任意 ε 的近似。有趣的是，我们还证明该构造无法扩展到正则分布，并且在多个竞拍者的情况下 ε 无法被消除。
英文摘要：
We consider the sale of a single item to multiple buyers by a revenue-maximizing seller. Recent work of Akbarpour and Li formalizes \emph{credibility} as an auction desideratum, and prove that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof auction is the ascending price auction with reserves (Akbarpour and Li, 2019). In contrast, when buyers' valuations are MHR, we show that the mild additional assumption of a cryptographically secure commitment scheme suffices for a simple \emph{two-round} auction which is optimal, strategyproof, and credible (even when the number of bidders is only known by the auctioneer). We extend our analysis to the case when buyer valuations are $α$-strongly regular for any $α> 0$, up to arbitrary $\varepsilon$ in credibility. Interestingly, we also prove that this construction cannot be extended to regular distributions, nor can the $\varepsilon$ be removed with multiple bidders.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
