AI 中文总结
该研究针对集中式择校中设计者可能偏离机制偏袒学生的问题，分析了学生信息受限下的机制可信度，发现延迟接受机制的可信度表现最优，其与其他机制的排名随学生可观察的分配范围变化而反转。
AI 中文摘要
在集中式择校中，宣布机制的设计者可能会偏离该机制以偏袒某些学生且不被察觉。若一个机制不存在此类偏离，则它是可信的。我们研究当学生不知道他人的报告且可能仅观察到部分分配时的可信度问题。可信度要求很高：在常见的择校机制中，仅延迟接受机制是可信的，且仅当学生观察到足够多的分配时才成立。因此我们按可信度对机制进行排名：无论学生观察到多少分配，延迟接受机制比任何其他稳定机制更可信，且严格比波士顿机制更可信。它与最高交易周期机制、效率调整后的延迟接受机制的排名取决于披露情况：当学生观察到全部分配时，延迟接受机制严格更可信；而当学生仅观察到自己的分配时，排名则反转。
英文摘要
In centralized school choice, a designer who announces a mechanism may deviate from it to favor some students without being detected. A mechanism is credible if it admits no such deviation. We study this credibility problem when students do not know others' reports and may observe only part of the assignment. Credibility is demanding: among common school choice mechanisms, only deferred acceptance is credible, and only when students observe enough of the assignment. We therefore rank mechanisms by their credibility. Deferred acceptance is more credible than any other stable mechanism and strictly more credible than the Boston mechanism, regardless of how much of the assignment students observe. Its ranking relative to top trading cycles and efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance depends on disclosure: deferred acceptance is strictly more credible when students observe the entire assignment, whereas the ranking reverses when students observe only their own assignment.
