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arXiv 2202.07944econ.TH
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论充分披露的最优性

On the optimality of full disclosure

Emiliano Catonini, Sergey Stepanov

摘要:

私下通知的发送者可以向接收者承诺任何披露策略。我们表明,充分披露是最优的充分条件下,一些理想的性质。首先,它直接与当事人的效用函数对话,而不是与发送者的间接效用函数对话;这使得它易于解释和验证。其次,它不要求发送者的收益是后验均值的函数。第三,在某些特殊情况下,它比已知条件弱。有了这个,我们表明,充分披露是最佳的建模假设下,通常使用的委托代理论文。

英文摘要:

A privately-informed sender can commit to any disclosure policy towards a receiver. We show that full disclosure is optimal under a sufficient condition with some desirable properties. First, it speaks directly to the utility functions of the parties, as opposed to the indirect utility function of the sender; this makes it easily interpretable and verifiable. Second, it does not require the sender's payoff to be a function of the posterior mean. Third, it is weaker than the known conditions for some special cases. With this, we show that full disclosure is optimal under modeling assumptions commonly used in principal-agent papers.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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