最佳和稳健的公共信息披露
Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information
摘要:
决策者将公共信息披露给交互代理,而交互代理也获取昂贵的私人信息。更精确的公共信息降低了获取私人信息的精度和成本。考虑到这种影响,决策者应该采取什么样的披露规则?我们解决这个问题的两个替代假设下,使用线性二次高斯游戏任意二次材料福利和凸信息成本。首先,决策者知道私人信息的成本,并采用最优披露规则,以最大化期望福利。第二,决策者不确定的成本,并采用稳健的披露规则,以最大限度地提高最坏情况下的福利。取决于边际成本的弹性,最优规则在性质上与线性信息成本或外生私人信息的情况相同。当且仅当完全披露在一定信息成本下是最优的时,最坏情况下的福利才严格增加,这为中央银行的透明度提供了一个新的理论基础。
英文摘要:
A policymaker discloses public information to interacting agents who also acquire costly private information. More precise public information reduces the precision and cost of acquired private information. Considering this effect, what disclosure rule should the policymaker adopt? We address this question under two alternative assumptions using a linear quadratic Gaussian game with arbitrary quadratic material welfare and convex information costs. First, the policymaker knows the cost of private information and adopts an optimal disclosure rule to maximize the expected welfare. Second, the policymaker is uncertain about the cost and adopts a robust disclosure rule to maximize the worst-case welfare. Depending on the elasticity of marginal cost, an optimal rule is qualitatively the same as that in the case of either a linear information cost or exogenous private information. The worst-case welfare is strictly increasing if and only if full disclosure is optimal under some information costs, which provides a new rationale for central bank transparency.
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