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arXiv 2510.21759econ.TH
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声誉与进入范围

Reputation, Disclosure, and the Scope of Entry

International College of Economics and Finance, HSE University(国际经济与金融学院,高等经济学院);Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole(图卢兹经济学院,图卢兹第一大学)

Rubik Khachatryan, Georgy Lukyanov

AI总结:

研究在位企业、先驱者与挑战者间关系,探讨在位企业应对能力及先驱者待遇公开性对挑战者进入组合的影响。基于共享凸性资源建立模型,发现可见度影响在位企业模仿及挑战者组合选择,还刻画了机制、条件与边界。

摘要:

在位企业对待先驱者的方式不仅能决定后来的竞争对手是否进入,还能决定其进入的广度。我们研究了一个具有私下知晓的应对能力的在位企业、一个其待遇可能公开的先驱者以及一个选择进入组合的后来挑战者。与累加式多对手声誉模型不同,应对措施利用的是共享的凸性资源:进入范围更广虽会稀释每个市场的防御,但总体防御仍会增加,所以组合规模不会从声誉激励中抵消。我们表明,更高的可见度会促使能力低的在位企业更多地模仿,使经证实的斗争对高能力的诊断性降低,且在此记录条件下,会使挑战者转向规模略大的组合。这种调整不一定是渐进的。由于只选择组合收益上凹包络线上的点,随着可信度下降,中间规模可能会脱离该凹包络线,正概率质量随后会直接跃升至更广泛的推广——即进入浪潮。我们刻画了任意数量市场的机制,并确定了其运行的原始条件以及组合渠道消失的两个边界——一个市场或累加式防御。

英文摘要:

We study how shared response resources affect reputation, entry, and disclosure. A later rival chooses whether to enter zero, one, or two markets. The incumbent then makes profitable cost-reducing investments. Shared costs make broader entry weaken the response in each market and can eliminate the incentive to enter only one. The incumbent's response cost is private information. Publishing its conduct in an earlier market encourages imitation by the less capable type, making a published response less informative and inducing broader entry. Our main result compares shared and separable response costs while holding all early and single-market payoffs fixed. We prove analytically that, on a nonempty open set of primitives with uniform setup costs, full publication maximizes total surplus under shared costs when publication is inexpensive, whereas no publication is optimal under separable costs. A capability audit is dominated in both economies. The reversal arises because shared costs strengthen the incentive for productive reputational investment. It does not require a disclosure-induced change in the available entry scales. Expected entry scope is unchanged across policies within each technology, so entry counts alone cannot evaluate disclosure.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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