质量披露的稳健定价
Robust Pricing for Quality Disclosure
AI总结：
本文研究平台在质量披露场景下的稳健定价问题，提出能诱导唯一均衡、逐步打破披露不足均衡的最优定价策略，证实该策略可实现社会高效信息传递，且平台抽租能力随其中介价值提升而增强。
摘要：
平台会向生产者收取费用，以便在交易前向消费者披露质量证据。平台的目标是，在因生产者购买决策与消费者信念相互依存而可能产生的多重均衡中，最大化自身的收益保障值。平台的最优定价策略会巩固其市场守门人的地位：该策略会催生唯一均衡，其中未披露产品的感知价值低于生产成本。为实现这一目标，该定价策略通过诱导生产者多披露一点点信息，逐步打破披露不足的均衡。质量更高的生产者因披露优先级更高，能获得更高租金。尽管会损失租金，但对于任意给定的证据结构，平台都会最优地引导具有社会效率的信息传递，且它永远不会从篡改证据中获益。与非稳健基准相比，我们的框架得出了更符合直觉的比较静态结果：平台抽取剩余的能力随其作为信息中介的价值提升而增强。
英文摘要：
A platform charges a producer for disclosing quality evidence to consumers before trade. It aims to maximize its revenue guarantee across potentially multiple equilibria which arise from the interdependence of producer purchase decisions and consumer beliefs. The platform's optimal pricing strategy entrenches itself as a market gatekeeper: it induces a unique equilibrium in which non-disclosed products' perceived values are lower than the production cost. To achieve this goal, this pricing strategy iteratively destabilizes under-disclosure equilibria by luring producers to disclose slightly more. Higher-quality producers receive higher rents as their disclosure is prioritized. Despite losing rents, the platform optimally induces socially efficient information transmission for any given evidence structure, and it never benefits from garbling evidence. Compared to the non-robust benchmark, our framework generates more intuitive comparative statics: the platform's ability to extract surplus increases with its value as an information intermediary.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
