自愿信息披露与个性化定价
Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing
摘要：
隐私问题的核心是，公司可能会利用消费者数据进行价格歧视。一个常见的政策回应是，消费者应该能够控制哪些公司访问他们的数据以及如何访问。由于企业了解消费者的偏好的基础上看到的数据和消费者的披露选择，消费者控制的均衡影响是不清楚的。我们研究这些措施是否改善了垄断和竞争市场中的消费者福利。我们发现，消费者控制可以提高消费者福利相对于完美的价格歧视和没有个性化的定价。首先，消费者可以利用信息披露来增强竞争力。第二，消费者可以披露信息，甚至诱使垄断者降低价格。消费者控制是否能提高福利取决于信息披露技术和市场竞争力。在竞争性市场中，简单的披露技术就足够了。当面对垄断者时，消费者需要部分披露的可能性，以获得任何福利收益。
英文摘要：
Central to privacy concerns is that firms may use consumer data to price discriminate. A common policy response is that consumers should be given control over which firms access their data and how. Since firms learn about a consumer's preferences based on the data seen and the consumer's disclosure choices, the equilibrium implications of consumer control are unclear. We study whether such measures improve consumer welfare in monopolistic and competitive markets. We find that consumer control can improve consumer welfare relative to both perfect price discrimination and no personalized pricing. First, consumers can use disclosure to amplify competitive forces. Second, consumers can disclose information to induce even a monopolist to lower prices. Whether consumer control improves welfare depends on the disclosure technology and market competitiveness. Simple disclosure technologies suffice in competitive markets. When facing a monopolist, a consumer needs partial disclosure possibilities to obtain any welfare gains.
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