通过灵活的调查进行搜索和竞争
Search and Competition with Flexible Investigations
摘要：
我们修改的标准模型的价格竞争水平差异化的产品，不完美的信息，和搜索摩擦，让消费者灵活地获取信息的产品的匹配值在他们的访问。我们描述了消费者的最优搜索和信息获取协议，并分析了企业之间的定价博弈。值得注意的是，我们建立在搜索市场有搜索摩擦和信息摩擦，影响市场价格，利润和消费者福利的显着不同的方式之间的根本区别。虽然更高的搜索成本会带来更高的价格（以及公司的利润），但更高的信息获取成本会导致更低的价格，并可能使消费者受益。我们讨论了我们的研究结果的政策披露规则和隐藏的费用的影响。
英文摘要：
We modify the standard model of price competition with horizontally differentiated products, imperfect information, and search frictions by allowing consumers to flexibly acquire information about a product's match value during their visits. We characterize a consumer's optimal search and information acquisition protocol and analyze the pricing game between firms. Notably, we establish that in search markets there are fundamental differences between search frictions and information frictions, which affect market prices, profits, and consumer welfare in markedly different ways. Although higher search costs beget higher prices (and profits for firms), higher information acquisition costs lead to lower prices and may benefit consumers. We discuss implications of our findings for policies concerning disclosure rules and hidden fees.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
