被优先访问的竞争与有序搜索威慑
Competition for being visited first and ordered search deterrence
AI总结：
本文研究了在可观察定价策略下，卖家是否在首次访问时进行价格歧视的问题，发现均衡中不存在价格歧视行为。
摘要：
当顾客必须拜访卖家以了解其产品的估值时，卖家可能从在首次访问时收取较低价格而在买家返回时收取较高价格中获益。Armstrong和Zhou（2016）表明，当买家只能在访问时了解卖家的定价政策时，这种价格歧视可以在均衡中出现。我们偏离这一假设，假设卖家承诺可观察到的定价政策以引导消费者搜索，而买家可以决定优先访问谁。我们证明在均衡中没有卖家进行价格歧视。
英文摘要：
When customers must visit a seller to learn the valuation of its product, sellers potentially benefit from charging a lower price on the first visit and a higher price when a buyer returns. Armstrong and Zhou (2016) show that such price discrimination can arise in equilibrium when buyers learn a seller's pricing policy only upon visiting. We depart from this assumption by supposing that sellers commit to observable pricing policies that guide consumer search and buyers can choose whom to visit first. We show that no seller engages in price discrimination in equilibrium.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
