最佳注意力管理:一个易于处理的框架
Optimal Attention Management: A Tractable Framework
摘要:
一个善意的委托人向理性疏忽的代理人提供信息,而不内化代理人处理信息的成本。无论委托人提供什么信息,代理人都可能选择忽略一些信息。我们研究了一个易于处理的二次支付模型中的最优信息提供,其中完全披露不是最优的。我们的特点激励兼容的信息政策,即那些代理愿意充分注意。在一个有三个状态的典型例子中,最优披露涉及以中等注意力成本的信息失真。随着成本的增加,最优信息突然从淡化状态变为夸大状态。
英文摘要:
A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some. We study optimal information provision in a tractable model with quadratic payoffs where full disclosure is not optimal. We characterize incentive-compatible information policies, that is, those to which the agent willingly pays full attention. In a leading example with three states, optimal disclosure involves information distortion at intermediate costs of attention. As the cost increases, optimal information abruptly changes from downplaying the state to exaggerating the state.
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