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arXiv 2402.11961econ.TH
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气候披露政策的最优设计:透明度与外部性

Optimal Design of Climate Disclosure Policies: Transparency versus Externality

Shangen Li

AI总结:

本文研究气候披露监管中透明度的福利影响,指出提升透明度可能增大均衡外部性且不会损害企业利益,仅当企业掌握减排激励私人信息时需超二元披露的透明度,并给出阈值披露政策不失一般性的条件。

摘要:

更透明的气候披露政策会带来更低的排放吗?本文研究了气候披露监管中透明度的福利影响。披露透明度的提升可能导致更大的均衡外部性,但绝不会让企业境况变差。因此,强制全面披露与最大化企业私人收益、却无视随之而来的外部性并无二致。仅当企业掌握自身减排激励的私人信息时,超出二元披露范畴的透明度才是必要的。本文给出了聚焦阈值披露政策不失一般性的成立条件。

英文摘要:

Does a more transparent climate disclosure policy induce lower emissions? This paper examines the welfare implications of transparency in climate disclosure regulation. Increased disclosure transparency could result in a larger equilibrium externality, but never leaves the firm worse off. Consequently, mandating full disclosure is no different from maximizing the firm's private benefit while disregarding the ensuing externality. Transparency beyond binary disclosure is necessary only when the firm holds private information about its incentives for emission reduction. I provide conditions under which focusing on threshold disclosure policies entails no loss of generality.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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