基于选择性披露数据的推断
Inference from Selectively Disclosed Data
AI总结:
本文研究硬证据的选择性披露,用连续数据近似大型数据集,证明最优策略是模仿更优目标状态的分布,并刻画自愿披露均衡对不同发送者福利的影响。
摘要:
我们考虑一个发送者的披露问题:该发送者拥有包含大量硬证据的数据集,并希望说服接收者采取更高的行动。由于接收者会根据其所看到数据的分布进行推断,发送者有动机删除观测值,以模仿在更好状态下本会观察到的分布。我们利用一个以连续数据近似大型数据集的模型,预测发送者会披露哪些观测值。对发送者而言,最优做法是采取模仿策略:提交能够模仿某个更可取目标状态下自然分布的证据。我们刻画了这些模仿策略下的部分混同结果,并表明它们得到了那些能最大程度区分较高状态的结果数据的支持。相对于完全信息,自愿披露均衡降低了拥有少量数据或处于有利状态的发送者的福利——他们会完全披露数据,却承受接收者怀疑所带来的损害;同时,该均衡使能够获取大型数据集的发送者受益,他们可以在低状态下通过有利可图地删除观测值而获利。
英文摘要:
We consider the disclosure problem of a sender with a large data set of hard evidence who wants to persuade a receiver to take higher actions. Because the receiver will make inferences based on the distribution of the data they see, the sender has an incentive to drop observations to mimic the distributions that would be observed under better states. We predict which observations the sender discloses using a model that approximates large datasets with a continuum of data. It is optimal for the sender to play an imitation strategy, under which they submit evidence that imitates the natural distribution under some more desirable target state. We characterize the partial-pooling outcomes under these imitation strategies, and show that they are supported by data on the outcomes that maximally distinguish higher states. Relative to full information, the equilibrium with voluntary disclosure reduces the welfare of senders with little data or a favorable state, who fully disclose their data but suffer the receiver's skepticism, and benefits senders with access to large datasets, who can profitably drop observations under low states.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。