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arXiv 2103.12804econ.TH
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通过类别传递价值

Conveying Value via Categories

Paula Onuchic, Debraj Ray

摘要:

一个发送者把一个质量未知的物品卖给一个接收者,接收者为这个物品支付他的期望值。发送方承诺对质量进行单调分类。我们刻画了发送者的最优单调分类。使用我们的表征,我们研究了最优的充分汇集或充分分离,交替汇集和分离,并作出精确的意义上,其中汇集是占主导地位的分离。我们讨论的应用程序,扩展和概括,其中设计的一个评分计划,由利润最大化的学校,旨在信号学生的素质,同时激励学生学习。这种激励约束迫使单调性,也可以嵌入作为一个扭曲的学校的学生素质的先验,产生一个分类问题,不同的发送者和接收者的先验。

英文摘要:

A sender sells an object of unknown quality to a receiver who pays his expected value for it. Sender and receiver might hold different priors over quality. The sender commits to a monotonic categorization of quality. We characterize the sender's optimal monotonic categorization. Using our characterization, we study the optimality of full pooling or full separation, the alternation of pooling and separation, and make precise a sense in which pooling is dominant relative to separation. We discuss applications, extensions and generalizations, among them the design of a grading scheme by a profit-maximizing school which seeks to signal student qualities and simultaneously incentivize students to learn. Such incentive constraints force monotonicity, and can also be embedded as a distortion of the school's prior over student qualities, generating a categorization problem with distinct sender and receiver priors.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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