发送者-接收者廉价交谈互动中的信息最优设计
Optimal Information Design in Sender-Receiver Cheap Talk Interactions
AI总结:
本文研究了发送者-接收者廉价交谈互动中信息最优设计问题,提出通过模糊处理信息来提升双方效用,并给出了高效算法及扩展结果。
摘要:
本文考虑了在信息量不同的发送者和无能接收者之间廉价交谈互动的动态。尽管似乎拥有更多关于游戏状态的信息总是对发送者有利,但我们证明在某些情况下,对完全知情发送者的信息进行模糊处理不仅可以提高接收者在均衡中的效用,还可以提高发送者自身的效用。我们还提供了高效的算法,输出发送者-接收者场景中二元行动的最优信息量,并将部分结果扩展到多发送者和一个接收者的设置中。
英文摘要:
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having additional information about the state of the game is always beneficial to the sender, we show that there are cases in which garbling the information of a fully informed sender can improve not only receiver's utility in equilibrium, but also that of the sender herself. We also provide efficient algorithms that output the optimal amount of information in sender-receiver scenarios with binary actions and extend some of these results to settings with multiple senders and one receiver.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。