意见动态中的网络诱导战略通信
Network-Induced Strategic Communication in Opinion Dynamics
AI总结：
研究意见动态中网络诱导的战略通信，通过加权影响网络上的战略通信博弈推导通信映射，证明网络对发送者影响由夸张因子概括，通信规则成行为机制，为CODA动态提供基础，还预测了说话者夸张与表达情况。
AI中文摘要：
经典意见动态通常假设从私人意见到公共信号有固定映射，如线性交换、饱和信号或离散公共行动。本文表明这些通信映射可从加权影响网络上的战略通信博弈推导得出。每个代理既是估计邻居状态的接收者，又是广播公共信号影响受众的发送者。证明网络对发送者的影响由网络诱导夸张因子概括，网络博弈解耦为独立的标量廉价交谈问题。通信规则成为一种模型的行为机制：一致激励恢复线性平均；有说服力的发送者面对天真接收者产生饱和信号；有说服力的发送者面对贝叶斯接收者无法可信地揭示其意见，所以均衡通信成为区间量化器，为连续意见离散行动（CODA）动态提供博弈论基础。嵌入重复意见更新中，产生的战略CODA动态保持意见聚类并排除极端主义。该模型预测，当受众受其影响较小时，说话者会更夸张，在强烈夸张下，即使私人意见保持连续，可信的公共表达也会坍缩为二元立场。
英文摘要：
Classical opinion dynamics typically assume a fixed mapping from private opinions to public signals, such as linear exchange, saturated signaling, or discrete public actions. In this paper, we show that these communication mappings can be derived from a strategic communication game played on a weighted influence network. Each agent acts as a receiver estimating its neighbors' states and as a sender broadcasting a public signal to influence its audience. We prove that the network's effect on a sender is summarized by a scalar, network-induced exaggeration factor, and the network game decouples into independent scalar cheap talk problems. The communication rules then emerge as behavioral regimes of one model: aligned incentives recover linear averaging; persuasive senders facing naive receivers produce saturated signaling; and persuasive senders facing Bayesian receivers cannot credibly reveal their opinions, so equilibrium communication becomes an interval quantizer, providing a game-theoretic foundation for continuous-opinion discrete-action (CODA) dynamics. Embedded in repeated opinion updates, the resulting strategic-CODA dynamics preserve opinion clustering and exclude extremism. The model predicts that a speaker exaggerates more when their audience is less influenced by them, and that under strong exaggeration, credible public expression collapses to a binary stance even while private opinions remain continuous.
