信息鲁棒廉价谈话
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk
摘要：
在一个具有二进制状态空间和状态独立发送者偏好的模型中，研究了廉价通话均衡对接收者的无穷小私人信息的鲁棒性。我们证明了发送者最优均衡是鲁棒的当且仅当该均衡要么没有向接收者揭示任何信息，要么完全揭示了一个具有正概率的状态。然后，我们描述的行动，可以发挥积极的概率在任何强大的均衡。最后，我们充分刻画了二进制接收者私人信息下的最优发送者效用，并给出了一般私人信息下的最优发送者效用的界。
英文摘要：
We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if and only if this equilibrium either reveals no information to the receiver or fully reveals one of the states with positive probability. We then characterize the actions that can be played with positive probability in any robust equilibrium. Finally, we fully characterize the optimal sender-utility under binary receiver's private information, and provide bounds for the optimal sender-utility under general private information.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
