验证廉价谈话
Checking Cheap Talk
AI总结：
本文研究了在多维状态下，通过发送者信息揭示最高状态组件，接收者选择检查该组件的均衡策略，探讨了沟通对发送者收益的影响。
摘要：
我们考虑了一个发送者-接收者博弈，在这个博弈中，接收者的行动是二元的，而发送者的偏好是状态无关的。状态是多维的。接收者可以在选择行动前选择一个状态的维度进行检查（即观察）。我们识别出一类有影响力的均衡，在这种均衡中，发送者的信息揭示了状态中哪些组件最高，接收者会选择其中一个组件进行检查。发送者只有在她偏好某个均衡优于无沟通结果时，才能从沟通中获益。当接收者可以检查多个维度时，也存在类似的均衡。
英文摘要：
We consider a sender-receiver game in which the receiver's action is binary and the sender's preferences are state-independent. The state is multidimensional. The receiver can select one dimension of the state to check (i.e., observe) before choosing his action. We identify a class of influential equilibria in which the sender's message reveals which components of the state are highest, and the receiver selects one of these components to check. In these equilibria, the sender's message guides the receiver to check positively selected attributes. We provide conditions under which these equilibria are sender-optimal, Pareto efficient, or receiver-optimal among all equilibria.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
