防重新谈判的廉价磋商
Renegotiation-Proof Cheap Talk
AI总结：
研究专家与决策者利益冲突下重复廉价磋商问题，指出最优收益虽可实现但易受重新谈判影响，帕累托有效防重新谈判均衡需妥协，其收益取决于专家偏好等，不同环境下专家与决策者利益受不同影响。
摘要：
一个信息充分的专家和一个信息不足的决策者，利益冲突，在一系列新的决策问题中进行重复的廉价磋商沟通。虽然决策者的最优收益在某些子博弈完美均衡中可以实现，但没有接近决策者最优收益的收益配置能免受重新谈判的影响。帕累托有效的防重新谈判均衡需要专家和决策者之间的妥协。这可能包括专家说实话而决策者没有充分利用这些信息。决策者的最大防重新谈判均衡收益取决于专家的偏好和状态的先验分布。在克劳福德和索贝尔（1982）的环境中，偏见更大的专家会损害决策者的利益。在一个专家动机透明的模型中，波动性更大的环境会损害决策者的利益而帮助专家。
英文摘要：
An informed Expert and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in a sequence of new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame perfect equilibrium, no payoff profile close to the Decision-Maker's optimal one is immune to renegotiation. Pareto efficient renegotiation-proof equilibria entail a compromise between the Expert and the Decision-Maker. This could involve the Expert being truthful and the Decision-Maker not fully utilizing this information to their advantage. The Decision-Maker's maximal renegotiation-proof equilibrium payoff depends on the Expert's preferences and the prior distribution of the state. In the Crawford and Sobel (1982) environment a more biased Expert harms the Decision-Maker. In a model with transparent Expert motives a more volatile environment harms the Decision-Maker while helping the Expert.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
