交叉验证和说服性的廉价谈话
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk
摘要：
我们研究了一个廉价的谈话游戏，两个专家首先选择什么样的信息来获取，然后提供建议，决策者的行动影响所有的福利。专家们不能承诺报告战略。然而，我们表明，决策者的能力，交叉验证专家的意见作为专家的承诺装置。我们证明了一个均衡的存在，其中一个专家的均衡收益等于他会得到什么，如果他能承诺如实透露他的信息。
英文摘要：
We study a cheap-talk game where two experts first choose what information to acquire and then offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that the decision-maker's ability to cross-verify the experts' advice acts as a commitment device for the experts. We prove the existence of an equilibrium, where an expert's equilibrium payoff is equal to what he would obtain if he could commit to truthfully revealing his information.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
